Q&A 9, Second Answer

My question is: Are there any instances in which morality is subjective or relative?

 Only, I think, in the sense that in some cases there may be more than one moral or immoral option.  If there are multiple options which are equal in terms of morality, then the question of which is 'better' is up to the person making the choice - in other words, subjective.  I do not think that there are any instances in which one option can be genuinely better than another in some cases, but not in others wherein the circumstances are effectively identical.

Q&A 9, First Answer

My question is: Can thoughts or emotions be immoral?

I do not think they can.  Isolated from actions, which they may or may not lead to, thoughts and emotions harm no one but (in some cases) the person who is thinking or feeling them.  As such, they are not immoral, because they do not negatively affect others.  The actions resulting from those thoughts or emotions may be immoral, but that does not make the sources immoral.  Furthermore, to suggest that thoughts and emotions, even disconnected from actions, can be immoral renders a completely moral life basically impossible, because thoughts and emotions are sometimes impossible to control.  Even if one makes allowance for this, by invoking the 'ought-implies-can' concept, it still mandates that people attempt to repress natural thoughts and emotions in order to comply with morality - something which is almost universally severely damaging, and which can lead to people becoming unbalanced and therefore acting in immoral ways.  Lastly, in most cases, legal systems attempt to enforce morality by means of banning or regulation.  It is impossible to regulate the thoughts and emotions of others (and even if it were possible, I think it would be radically immoral).  This is yet another aspect which sets thoughts and emotions apart from actions in terms of moral value.

Guilt and Immorality

While guilt can in doubtless contribute to someone's deciding to act morally, in some cases I think that it can actually cause immoral acts.  In my opinion, guilt is not an innate guide to good and evil, but is primarily a product of the circumstances in which a person grows up and lives.  Therefore, it can be misguided, and not synchronised with actual morality.  In addition to the obvious cases of simply omission of moral principles (such as a person not feeling guilty for treating homosexual people badly), it can extend to causing people to feel guilty about things which are morally correct, and therefore decide not to do those things (for example, an individual seeing a homosexual person in need of assistance might consider helping that person but ultimately decide not to because they feel guilty about assisting an 'enemy').

Response: Religion as a Source of Ethics

In response to Kelsey Phifer's post "Religion and Moral Reasoning" (May 3, 2012):

I do think that religion, and particularly contemplation of a religious conception of guilt, can indeed lead people to adopt ethical ways of living.  However, I do not think that this is the only or even the best method of formulating a code of ethics.  The reliance of many religions on scripture can often lead to stagnation of the morals of religious followers - not a good thing, as I think that it is vital to continually question and re-evaluate moral codes in order to ensure that one has reached the correct moral conclusions.  If, however, some people find it nice, for some reason, to follow a religious code of morality, that is fine, provided that their code does not conflict in any major way with secular morality.

Q&A 8, Second Answer

The basic form of my question is: How should a teacher react if a student comes up with a theory more rational than the teacher's?

I think that, ideally, the teacher should accept the student's theory and perhaps incorporate it into their curriculum.  The only case wherein this could be a problem is if the student believes that, because one of their theories was more rational than their teacher's, all of their theories will be so.  In that case, the teacher may wish to incorporate the theory in after the student has left their class.

Q&A 8, First Answer

My question is: Does rational thinking ever lead to more than one equally valid, best conclusion?

I do not think so.  It may lead to a somewhat open conclusion, from which one can draw multiple possible conclusions.  For example, one may decide that rationality excludes the existence of a physical god, but leaves open the possibilities of a transcendent god or no god.  As such, some forms of theism, some forms of atheism, and agnosticism are all equally rational viewpoints.  However, if one does not add on the element of belief, then rationality alone leads only to one (possibly open) conclusion.

Response: Source of Conscience

In response to Andrew Bagley's post "Dostoevsky on Conscience" (April 28, 2012):

Relying on conscience to guide a society has more problems than simply the existence of psychopaths.  Conscience is, itself, largely a product of society; if one grows up in a society which condones cannibalism, for example, one is unlikely to find cannibalism ethically problematic unless one takes some time to think critically about the practice.  This may seem virtually irrelevant, as very few societies do support the idea of cannibalism (and therefore most people refrain from it due to their consciences), but subtler examples are far more widespread.  Many societies see no problem with homophobia, sexism, racism, torture, or child abuse.  As such, people who grow up in these cultures will not find these sorts of mindsets or practices unconscionable.  It may be true that humans are all born with the same innate rules of conscience; however, society bends and warps these rules far before humans mature enough to consciously decide to abide by these rules rather than those of their societies.

Response: Possible Pronouns

In response to Brandon Gaudet's post "He or She is Not Gender Neutral" (April 21, 2012):

In addition to the somewhat problematic singular 'they,' people have attempted to come up with various alternative pronouns which are gender neutral.  Perhaps the best known of these is the 'ze/zhe, zir/hir' system.  Unfortunately, in modern culture, people tend to use these pronouns only for those who do not fit into the gender binary, not to refer to a person of unknown gender (as in, 'the cloaked individual adjusted zir hood').  Furthermore, many find these pronouns rather awkward to use, as the letter 'z' is uncommon.  The pronouns are also rather annoyingly close to pre-existing gender-specific pronouns - 'ze' is basically 'he', 'hir' is almost indistinguishable from 'her.'  As such, I think it would be easier for people to adjust to singular, gender-neutral pronouns based off 'they' and 'their' - perhaps 'vey' and 'veir,' as the 'v' sound is not terribly dissimilar to the 'th' sound.  This way, one would be more likely to associate the new pronouns with the gender-neutral term 'they' than with the single-gender 'he' or 'she.'

Unemotional Reasoning

While, in an earlier post, I acknowledged the potential usefulness of felt reasons as a tool for appeal to the masses, I also think that felt reasons have some major flaws which non-felt reasons do not possess.  Most importantly, I think that basing one's actions on felt reasons can result in one neglecting certain morally obligatory actions because they fail to appeal to one's emotions.  As a personal example of this, I am a vegetarian for ethical reasons.  I made the decision to become a vegetarian due to non-felt reasons; if I had relied on felt reasons, I would likely only have eliminated some meats from my diet, because I dislike certain animals from which common meat products come, such as cows.  Thus, if I had relied on felt reasons, I would still eat beef.

It is true that one can apply general felt reasons to specific categories - so, one can decide that cruelty to animals is wrong based on felt reasons, and then apply that to all individual animals despite dislike for some animals.  However, the sizes of categories and their relationships to one another are variable, and so hard to determine.  It would be very easy to claim that a general felt reason did not apply to some specific category or another.

Rejecting Solipsism

In class, we touched on the subject of solipsism and how many people choose to reject it because it 'feels wrong.'  I will not argue about the latter point; it seems likely that most people do find that it feels wrong.  However, I am not certain that this is a valid basis for rejecting it.  Saying that something cannot be so because it feels wrong leads very quickly down a slippery slope to invalid and illogical arguments.  For example, the applied-ethics theorist Michael Levin claims that homosexuality must be unnatural or immoral because, to him, it 'feels wrong' - specifically, he finds the idea of homosexual acts repulsive.

Of course, we may accept the possibility of solipsism but still choose to act as if we know that other people, and the world around us, exists.  Thus, we can build up metaphysical and ethical theories, discuss existentialism and the nature of humanity, and otherwise philosophise with the base assumption that empirical evidence is relatively reliable.  This is a kind of contained fallibilism, whereby one can interact with the world as it seems to be (due to granting a higher likelihood to this view of reality), yet not deny or even really dispute the possibility that absolutely nothing may be as it appears.

Response: Inspirational Literature

In response to Jacob Wheeler's post "Dissemination" (April 15, 2012):

I agree that literature can help disseminate information unrelated to ethics.  One particular use of this ability is inspiration.  A text utilising emotionally charged language to describe the exploits of scientists might inspire readers to pursue the study of science themselves.  Of course, they may find that it is not as thrilling as depicted in the text, but hopefully some of them would continue their studies regardless.

Such use of literature requires caution, however.  Inaccurate portrayals of certain careers, activities, or other aspects of life may at first inspire readers to take action based off the text, and then result in their eventual disillusionment because of the text's lack of accuracy.  This would actually cause more harm than good in terms of whatever the text's writer hoped to accomplish.

Response: Mass Appeal

In response to Kelsey Phifer's post "Felt Reasons and Caring" (April 20, 2012):

While I think that, ideally, people should take action based off reason alone, I do agree that in many (possibly most) cases, they require some sort of emotional impetus.  As such, while felt reasons may hold relatively little value for people who regularly engage in critical thinking, they may hold a great deal of value for the majority of humanity.  No matter how logical one's argument, one is unlikely to sway many others to one's cause without a dose of emotionally charged rhetoric.  As an example, comparatively few people choose to become vegetarian or vegan based solely off rational argumentation about the ethics of animal (and animal product) consumption.  A significantly higher portion of people become vegetarian or vegan after seeing graphic documentaries depicting animal abuse in the meat and dairy industries.  I think that this reliance on emotion to make ethical choices is both problematic and regrettable, but it may be part of human nature, or at least part of human society now and for some time in the future.  As such, I think that felt reasons do have merit.

Objective Emotion (or Lack Thereof)

According to Nussbaum, ethics are objective, but they stem from such things as emotion and personal world-view.  I think that this is not in fact possible.  Emotions, by their very nature, are subjective.  They may, in some situations, be objectively appropriate, or objectively understandable, or objectively justified, but they themselves are still subjective, because they differ from person to person.  In many (if not all) situations, there is not one single appropriate emotion - many different emotional responses are equally appropriate (and sometimes equally rational).  Even though certain emotions may be inappropriate, there is still an array of appropriate emotions.

As such, emotions are both subjective, variable, and frequently irrational.  While they may have a place in moral philosophy, using them as a basis for an ethical system is, I think, very ill-advised.  For example, basing one's justification for the moral necessity of vegetarianism or veganism on the idea that non-human animals are adorable (and as such, eating them is undesirable) will not help to convince many people of this moral necessity, because many people may think that certain animals are not adorable.  They can justify their continued meat consumption easily - "I think cows are ugly and smelly, so I shall continue to eat them."  An ethical system based on rationality is far less easy to dispute successfully.

Response: Morally Obligatory Information?

In response to Corey Sloane's post "The Moral Vehicle of Literature" (April 11, 2012):

I agree that literature is a useful medium through which minority groups can communicate their viewpoints.  However, due to the optional anonymity of authors, literature (about characters belonging to minority groups) can also be a way for members of majorities to inaccurately portray minority groups and thus actually contribute to their oppressive or marginalised situations.  As such, I wonder if one say that an author of books regarding a minority group, who actually belongs to that group, has a moral obligation to inform readers of their affiliation with the group, in order to help legitimatise their work and perhaps discredit the work of authors who portray the group badly.

On reflection, however, I do not think that such information is necessary.  Because of the flexibility of authorial personas, authors who wish to portray members of minority groups badly can simply pretend to belong to those groups, rendering the information useless.  Also, members of majority groups may sometimes be quite able to portray minority group members accurately, due to acquaintance or research, and invalidating their writings simply because they do not belong to a particular group is, I think, wrong.

Q&A 7, Second Answer

The basic form of my question is: Has literature ever contributed to other forms of human understanding?

I think so, yes.  Some of the greatest works of literature have also been brilliant studies in human nature, which may help sociologists and psychologists develop theories of behaviour at later dates.  Science fiction works have on more than one occasion provided inspiration for technological innovations.  Some books, such as religious texts, have certainly influenced human development to a huge degree, but I am less certain about whether or not they have contributed to human understanding - if the religions found in the texts are true, then I suppose they would have.

Q&A 7, First Answer

My question is: Should we consider religious texts literature?

It depends upon the specific texts in question.  Some religious texts are essentially lists of what one should or should not do, and I would not consider these literature.  Others, like the Dhammapada or the Quran, are undeniably poetic in style, and in fact often acknowledged by their own followers to be forms of art - many Muslims consider the Quran to showcase the most beautiful use of the Arabic language at any time, and in fact strive to emulate its style in other literary works.  Cases like the Bible are trickier; while some parts of the Bible are somewhat poetic, and (debatably) many of the stories therein are metaphorical, Christians often find the idea of referring to the Bible as literature insulting.  This may be because many people in contemporary times have come to think of the term 'literature' as referring only to fictional works.