In response to Jacob Wheeler's post "Dissemination" (April 15, 2012):
I agree that literature can help disseminate information unrelated to ethics. One particular use of this ability is inspiration. A text utilising emotionally charged language to describe the exploits of scientists might inspire readers to pursue the study of science themselves. Of course, they may find that it is not as thrilling as depicted in the text, but hopefully some of them would continue their studies regardless.
Such use of literature requires caution, however. Inaccurate portrayals of certain careers, activities, or other aspects of life may at first inspire readers to take action based off the text, and then result in their eventual disillusionment because of the text's lack of accuracy. This would actually cause more harm than good in terms of whatever the text's writer hoped to accomplish.
Saturday, April 21, 2012
Response: Mass Appeal
In response to Kelsey Phifer's post "Felt Reasons and Caring" (April 20, 2012):
While I think that, ideally, people should take action based off reason alone, I do agree that in many (possibly most) cases, they require some sort of emotional impetus. As such, while felt reasons may hold relatively little value for people who regularly engage in critical thinking, they may hold a great deal of value for the majority of humanity. No matter how logical one's argument, one is unlikely to sway many others to one's cause without a dose of emotionally charged rhetoric. As an example, comparatively few people choose to become vegetarian or vegan based solely off rational argumentation about the ethics of animal (and animal product) consumption. A significantly higher portion of people become vegetarian or vegan after seeing graphic documentaries depicting animal abuse in the meat and dairy industries. I think that this reliance on emotion to make ethical choices is both problematic and regrettable, but it may be part of human nature, or at least part of human society now and for some time in the future. As such, I think that felt reasons do have merit.
While I think that, ideally, people should take action based off reason alone, I do agree that in many (possibly most) cases, they require some sort of emotional impetus. As such, while felt reasons may hold relatively little value for people who regularly engage in critical thinking, they may hold a great deal of value for the majority of humanity. No matter how logical one's argument, one is unlikely to sway many others to one's cause without a dose of emotionally charged rhetoric. As an example, comparatively few people choose to become vegetarian or vegan based solely off rational argumentation about the ethics of animal (and animal product) consumption. A significantly higher portion of people become vegetarian or vegan after seeing graphic documentaries depicting animal abuse in the meat and dairy industries. I think that this reliance on emotion to make ethical choices is both problematic and regrettable, but it may be part of human nature, or at least part of human society now and for some time in the future. As such, I think that felt reasons do have merit.
Sunday, April 15, 2012
Objective Emotion (or Lack Thereof)
According to Nussbaum, ethics are objective, but they stem from such things as emotion and personal world-view. I think that this is not in fact possible. Emotions, by their very nature, are subjective. They may, in some situations, be objectively appropriate, or objectively understandable, or objectively justified, but they themselves are still subjective, because they differ from person to person. In many (if not all) situations, there is not one single appropriate emotion - many different emotional responses are equally appropriate (and sometimes equally rational). Even though certain emotions may be inappropriate, there is still an array of appropriate emotions.
As such, emotions are both subjective, variable, and frequently irrational. While they may have a place in moral philosophy, using them as a basis for an ethical system is, I think, very ill-advised. For example, basing one's justification for the moral necessity of vegetarianism or veganism on the idea that non-human animals are adorable (and as such, eating them is undesirable) will not help to convince many people of this moral necessity, because many people may think that certain animals are not adorable. They can justify their continued meat consumption easily - "I think cows are ugly and smelly, so I shall continue to eat them." An ethical system based on rationality is far less easy to dispute successfully.
As such, emotions are both subjective, variable, and frequently irrational. While they may have a place in moral philosophy, using them as a basis for an ethical system is, I think, very ill-advised. For example, basing one's justification for the moral necessity of vegetarianism or veganism on the idea that non-human animals are adorable (and as such, eating them is undesirable) will not help to convince many people of this moral necessity, because many people may think that certain animals are not adorable. They can justify their continued meat consumption easily - "I think cows are ugly and smelly, so I shall continue to eat them." An ethical system based on rationality is far less easy to dispute successfully.
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