In class, we touched on the subject of solipsism and how many people choose to reject it because it 'feels wrong.' I will not argue about the latter point; it seems likely that most people do find that it feels wrong. However, I am not certain that this is a valid basis for rejecting it. Saying that something cannot be so because it feels wrong leads very quickly down a slippery slope to invalid and illogical arguments. For example, the applied-ethics theorist Michael Levin claims that homosexuality must be unnatural or immoral because, to him, it 'feels wrong' - specifically, he finds the idea of homosexual acts repulsive.
Of course, we may accept the possibility of solipsism but still choose to act as if we know that other people, and the world around us, exists. Thus, we can build up metaphysical and ethical theories, discuss existentialism and the nature of humanity, and otherwise philosophise with the base assumption that empirical evidence is relatively reliable. This is a kind of contained fallibilism, whereby one can interact with the world as it seems to be (due to granting a higher likelihood to this view of reality), yet not deny or even really dispute the possibility that absolutely nothing may be as it appears.
Note this is not entirely related to your post; I simply wanted to comment on Solipsism, and was reminded of that when I saw your post.
ReplyDeleteI think that felt reasons are certainly limited and are especially subjective. Michael Levin, as you pointed out, is a prime example of that fact. Levin assumes that because he finds the idea of homosexuality repulsive, everyone must also find the same thing.
I think that the idea of solipsism is strikingly more interesting because most of humanity feels that it is wrong due to the fact that they live in this apparently empirically observable universe. I agree that it would be best to not deny the possibility that solipsism could indeed be correct. I do think, however, that there are benefits to assuming it is not. It does appear as though the empirically observable universe, even if we make all of it up, does affect us. For example, if we decided that nobody actually exists and thereby concluded that it would be okay to punch a police officer in the face, we will find out that the figments of our imagination will throw is in what appears to be an actual prison. Even if we claim to know that the prison is not real, we have no way to escape it.